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In the past, natural resources such as coal and iron ore were catalysts for
development and the economic theory focused mainlyon how the exploitation
of natural resources could promote trade and development. Since the 1970s,
however, we have been increasingly confronted with resource-rich countries
lagging behind in economic growth and facing high risks of violent conflict.
Using Sierra Leone as a case study, this article briefly explores the resource
curse paradox, noting the role of the national government and international
actors in maintaining the status quo. It highlights the fragile state of post-
conflict governments, focusing on the delicate balance between attracting
foreign investment and fighting corruption and poverty in environments
already susceptible to recurring violence. The article further examines both
government and private sector activities that have contributed to the economies
of violence through unequal distribution of natural resource rents and revenues.
It also argues that to move from resource curse to resource blessing, both the
affected states and the international community need to refocus their attention
on the effectiveness of returns on natural resource revenues and the critical
role of transnational corporations in perpetuating the curse.
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the exploitation of natural resources could promote trade and
development.1 Since the 1970s, however, we have been increasingly
confronted with resource-rich countries lagging behind in economic
growthand facing high risks of violent conflict.2 Economic theories have
focused on finding answers to the unequal development and proposing
that the poor institutional structures inherited from the colonialists
have been key in perpetuating a cycle of poor economic growth despite
an abundance of natural resources.3 Scholars have also argued that the
scarcity of natural resources can lead to conflict,4 but more recently the
focus has been on conflict states that are rich in natural resources.In
fact, Collier5 identifies natural resources as one of the traps of
development and notes that the presence of resource rents makes
“democracy malfunction”6 with autocracies outperforming democracies
when it comes to growth, unless checks and balances are set on
government activities.
States having a wealth of natural resources are now commonly
associated with authoritarian governments, exploitation, corruption,
mismanagement, inequality, and war. We are all familiar with the terms
resource curse, blood diamonds and other conflict resources, which
have been linked to both sparking and fuelling armed conflicts.7 While
the debate continues on whether the resource curse is due more to
abundance or dependence on natural resources (or both), it is clear
that countries which should be developing and growing economically
by taking advantage of the resources at their disposal, are in fact being
adversely affected.
Using Sierra Leone as a case study, this article briefly explores the
resource curse paradox, noting the role of the national government
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and international actors in maintaining the status quo. It highlights
the fragile state of post-conflict governments in particular, focusing on
the delicate balance between attracting foreign investment and fighting
corruption and poverty in environments already susceptible to recurring
violence.Highlighting the difference between emerging economies
(which have largely overcome the curse) and fragile states (which have
not), the article examines both government and private sector activities
which have contributed to the economies of violence8 through the
unequal distribution of natural resource rents and revenues. It
arguesfurther that to move from resource curse to resource blessing,
both the affected states and the international community need to
refocus their attention on the effectiveness of returns on natural resource
revenues and the critical role of transnational corporations in
perpetuating the curse.
2.  NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
The change from resource curse to blessing is complex, particularly in
post-conflict countries. While emerging economies such as China and
India have managed to grow quite spectacularly, entering the market
at just the right time and while the oil-rich Middle Eastern states can
affordto live off the rents from oil,9 post-conflict and conflict-affected
states that are rich in natural resources are characterized by a peculiar
stagnancy. Many seem unable to escape the resource trap. Poverty is
chronic and locally the interplay between various levels of government
and community leaders and groups is strained by weak government
institutions, little oversight, and large-scale corruption. Many of these
states are in what Collier10 terms the bottom billion – states that have
not only not grown in recent years, but have in fact been falling behind
and shrinking in absolute terms. They have been subject to volatile
market trends, growing and shrinking based on global changing
resource prices, with few regulations in place to shield the states from
the losses they endure when prices fall.11
8 Michael Watts, “Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger
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According to Watts12 the various levels and spaces of governance
inherent in the management of natural resources play an important
role in perpetuating the curse so prevalent in resource-rich countries,
particularly post-conflict. Watts borrows the term”governable spaces”
from Nikolas Rose13 to better explain the levels of governmentality14
involved in resource management. These spaces, which for Watts are
“specific configurations of territory, identity and rule”,15 identify
governance as a combination of the three factors at various levels,
from community and chieftaincy, to tribal and ethnic, all the way to
national centralized governments. Each of these levels features a distinct
area of rule, identity, and territory, all particularly important when
analysing governance structures. In countries such as Sierra Leone where
the central government has a weak control over regional councils and
chiefs, each level may act within its own sphere of influence without
coordinating with the other, and sometimes even operate in
contradiction to the other.
Introduced into the governable spaces through oil capital (or
capitalism in general), is what Watts terms the oil complex16 or,
alternatively, the natural resource complex.17 The complex combines
the firm, state, and the community, and is territorially denoted through
concessions. The effects of capitalism on the complex and the various
combinations of actors within governable spaces, such as traditional
community leaders, youth, ethnic leaders, and state institutions, are
challenging to say the least. Each actor enters the space with their own
agenda, which rarely coincides with the agenda of the other actors
involved. Ideally, state institutions focus on the best interest of the
whole population, in reality however, and particularly in post-conflict
states, they are corrupt and generally have limited power. The
transnational corporations in turn are focused primarily on revenue
rather than the economic growth of the host state. Therefore, the change
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from resource curse to blessing will require a transformation in both
the governable spaces and the capital approach to resource extraction
and revenues.
While the analysis of these governable spaces is critical in fostering
improved national governance at all levels, thus helpingto lift the whole
economy out of poverty, it is also mired with difficulties. The elite for
whom the status quo means a constant inflow of funds and a
comfortable lifestyle, have little motivation to give up their luxuries in
order to promote more transparent and efficient economic processes
which would distribute revenues or rents from natural resources more
equally. Although continued efforts are made to encourage changes
domestically, much can still be done internationally. Thus, in adapting
Watts’ framework to the case of Sierra Leone I will explore the governable
spaces at the state level to better explain the complexities involved,
but will also suggest that the role of capital is critical in the search for
solutions. In fact, capital inflows and investments or undertakings by foreign
transnational corporations (TNCs) and the international community, can
either contribute to, or work against, the resource curse.
3.  APPLICATION OF GOVERNABLE
SPACES TO SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone is an African country struggling with the resource curse. It
exemplifies the small, post-conflict, resource-rich state, in sharp contrast
to the larger emerging economies or oil-rich Middle Eastern states which
seem to have evaded the curse. The future economic development and
political stability of Sierra Leone is not only of great importance for
the country itself, but has far-reaching consequences for peace building
and economic reconstruction efforts currently underway in West Africa,
a region plagued by civil strife and conflicts spanning decades.Since
the official end of a brutal civil war in January 2002, Sierra Leone has
held three successful and peaceful national democratic elections (2002,
2007, and 2012) and experienced one of the highest economic growth
rates in the region. That being said, the GDP growth rate has slowed
considerably since, peaking in 2013 at an astounding 20 per cent, and
is now forecasted to bottom out at 2 per cent in 2015,18 likely due at
18 World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects” (2015) <http://www.worldbank.org/
en/publication/global-economic-prospects/data?region=SST> accessed 4 June
2015.
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least in part to the Ebola outbreak and the subsequent falling of natural
resource prices.19 Furthermore, both the London Mining Limited and
African Minerals Limited, two of the largest mining companies in Sierra
Leone, have recently declared bankruptcy.20
These setbacks have had dramatic effects on the country considering
its reliance on the mining sector for economic growth. Before the war
(i.e., during the 1960s and 1970s), foreign exchange earnings from
mining were 70 per cent, 20 per cent of GDP and 15 per cent of fiscal
revenue.21 By 2010, mining accounted for close to 60 per cent of export
revenues, including US$132 million for diamonds, US$33 million for
rutile and US$31 million for bauxite.22 In addition, the resilience of
the populationhad already become low, with 52.3 per cent living in
conditions of extreme poverty (under US$1.90 PPP a day)23 and the
Human Development Index value (0.413 in 2014) falling below the
19 Daniel Gbondo, “It’s Time for a Re-Think on Natural Resource Management in
Sierra Leone” (NRGI Blog, 2015) <http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/
blog/its-time-re-think-natural-resource-management-sierra-leone> accessed
4 September 2015.
20 The two companies were the largest iron ore producers in Sierra Leone.
Following the 40 per cent fall of iron ore prices on the world market and the
strain of maintaining the company and investor interest during the Ebola crisis
both companies filed for bankruptcy due to cash shortages. Both companies
have been implicated in numerous human rights abuses, forced displacements,
and labour unrest. It is yet unclear whether the new owners of the companies
(the Chinese corporation Shandong Iron and Steel Group for African Minerals;
Timis Corp for London Mining) will commit to the promises made by the former
owners to provide forcibly resettled communities with food and water among
others. For more information please see T Steinweg and IDJ Romgens, “African
Minerals in Sierra Leone” (2015) <http://www.somo.nl/publications-en/
Publication_4208/at_download/fullfile> and “African Minerals, London Mining
and the Fall of Sierra Leone’s Irone Ore Sector”, Steel First (London, 10 March
2015) <https://www.steelfirst.com/Article/3434921/African-Minerals-
London-Mining-and-the-fall-of-Sierra-Leones-iron-ore-sector.html>
21 George J Coakley, “The Mineral Industry of Sierra Leone”, U.S. Geological Survey
Minerals Yearbook (2004) <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/
2004/slmyb04.pdf>
22 NRGI, “Natural Resource Governance Institute: Sierra Leone” (Resource
Governance Index, 2013) <http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/
africa/sierra-leone/overview> accessed 4 September 2015.
23 World Bank, “Sierra Leone Overview” (2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/
en/country/sierraleone/overview> accessed 10 April 2016.
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regional average for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (0.518 in 2014).24
The combination of the Ebola Crisis and the fall of iron ore prices have
made Sierra Leone to lose much of the gains it had made during the
spectacular growth period, underscoring its fragility.25 All sectors have
been affected, including agriculture, mining, construction,
manufacturing, and tourism. In November 2015, the World Health
Organization declared Sierra Leone Ebola-free26 and the Government
of Sierra Leone (GoSL) already has a National Ebola Recovery Strategy
in place27 in an effort to return to the upward growth path pre-Ebola
and in line with its Vision 2035.
Historically, natural resources in Sierra Leone have been exploited
by the elite at the expense of local development, and have thus
contributed to civil war and general unrest.Under the government of
Siaka Stevens from 1967 to 1996, mining rights were used by the
government as a strategic tool to ensure the loyalty of supporters and
to arm illicit diamond mining groups comprised mostly of unemployed
youths who served as “presidential forces” intimidating political
opponents when necessary.28 Using chiefs and traditional leaders to
reinforce the role of the armed groups as community defence groups, the
regime distanced itself from the communities leaving them to provide
their own local forms of rule and set about privatizing national institutions
to divert revenue from state coffers to Siaka Stevens’ private accounts.29
The rising rate of unemployment among the youth as well as the
lack of government investment in education coupled with the low
enrolment rates in schools30 posed a serious challenge to the economic
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sustainability of the country and eventually contributed to the outbreak
of the conflict in 1991.31 Despite the popularity of the army as a career
that many desired, it rarely provided a regular salary, thus forcing many
soldiers into the illicit diamond mining trade, creating the phenomenon
known as “sobels” – soldiers by day, rebels by night.32
The diamond industry, once the country’s most important sector,
peaked in the 1960s and 1970s with export values reaching two million
carats.33 During this period, it is estimated that at least half of the
country’s diamond output was still exported legally. By 1999, 98 per
cent of diamonds were believed to have been exported illegally. In
addition to the social impacts already discussed in the form of illicit
diamond mining and the ensuing armed defence groups, this
“informalization” of the trade had a tremendous economic impact on
the country because until the early 1970s the diamond trade had
accounted for 15 per cent of the GDP and 80 per cent of foreign-exchange
earnings, thus serving as a major source of tax revenue.34
Therefore, two decades of autocratic rule was all that was needed
to create the conditions that led to the emergence of a rebel group, the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Led by Foday Sankoh, the RUF
was a loosely organized rebel group supported by a number of external
actors and patrons, including Charles Taylor of Liberia, which aimed to
overthrow the government and gain control over the diamond-producing
regions.35 The civil war began in 1991 when the RUF launched its
rebellion against the ruling government of Joseph Saidu Momoh (All
People’s Congress – APC). The war came to an end in January 2002,
and general elections were declared. After a decade of civil conflict
resulting in the deaths of an estimated 70,000 people as well as the
displacement of approximately 2.6 million (over half of the population),
Sierra Leone has slowly begun to pick up the pieces, with the
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government restoring its authority and control.36 Iron ore production
has become the driving force of the economy (70 per cent of exports).37
This (over-)reliance on iron ore has been both beneficial and dangerous
as it leaves the economy at the mercy of market price fluctuations.
4.  GOVERNABLE SPACES
4.1 State Level
The Sierra Leone’s People Party (SLPP), which formed the government
in power from 2002 to 2007, was highly respected for its efforts to end
the country’s brutal civil war, but it is also increasingly being blamed
for widespread corruption and economic mismanagement.
Disappointment with the state became widespread, and the
government’s failure to execute policies and deliver social welfare
services, together with the regime’s relative inconsistency (“partial
democracy”), were perceived as threats to stability by the international
community.38 The high degree of militarization and state control of the
economy in an attempt at centralizationadded to the economic
grievances and also contributed to the ensuing instability.
The 2007 general elections were won by Ernest Bai Koroma (APC)
with 52.62 per cent of the votes in the second round. The voting of the
APC into power seemed to have been due in part to Koroma’s perceived
honest reputation, his promise to address systemic corruption in
government and the country’s development agenda. Koroma entered
his second term by winning the 2012 elections with 59 per cent in the
first round.39 Overall, the President seems to have a good reputation,
with his promise of “running the country like a business”often repeated
by Sierra Leoneans.40
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Thus, new institutions and regulations are being implemented, with
the government aiming at increasing revenues from resource exports
through standardized contracts and taxation schemes for TNCs such
as the new corporate income tax of 30 per cent which all companies
will be required to pay.41 Tax revenues have the potential to strengthen
state’s provision of public services and to moderate aid dependency.
By fostering economic recovery, investors play a crucial role in providing
economic opportunities through job creation and the provision of social
services, such as schools and health care facilities, consolidating the
peace efforts underway.
While old concession contracts are still honoured, new ones are
increasingly negotiated under the current regulations and policies, such
as the Minerals and Mines Act. Loopholes continue to exist, with the
central government and the local chiefdoms not always in agreement,
but the government is making attempts at improving transparency
through participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, among other
things. Acknowledging the problem of endemic corruption in the
system, the government established an Anti-Corruption Commission
in 2000, with an amended Act in 2008. In addition, it created a Diamond
Areas Community Development Fund in 2001 as part of the peace
process, in an attempt to alleviate some of the entrenched inequities
in the division of revenues, and topped these with the new 2003 Core
Mineral Policy which led to theMines and Minerals Actthat was adopted
in 2009.42
Despite these encouraging steps, corruption and tax evasion remain
major problems. The Mines and Minerals Agency responsible for
implementing the policy framework set out by the Ministry of Industry
is underfunded and the oversight is weak.43 Accordingly, the Natural
Resource Governance Institute (formerly Revenue Watch) gave Sierra
Leone a “weak” score of 46, ranking them 35th out of 58 countries in
2013.44 The lowest scores were associated with corruption, poor
accountability, poor adherence to the rule of law and government
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ineffectiveness. Consequently, Sierra Leone was briefly suspended from
EITI in 2013 for not meeting reporting standards.Moreover, the 2003
Core Mineral Policy was considered largely out-dated, while the Anti-
Corruption Commission has had mixed success. Central government
employees and chiefs, in particular, are seen mainly as part of the corrupt
elite.45 The Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources continues to
engage in direct negotiations with companies in the resource sector,
and the bidding processes are unclear.46 The process is, therefore,
fraught with incidences of back-door negotiations and corruption, such
as the favourable deals received by London Mining in allowing them
to largely ignore the Mining and Minerals Act of 2009 and pay lower
taxes47 a day after the Act came into force.
Tensions are commonbetween the government, chiefs, and
community. The Community Development Fund48 has had wide ranging
success in some communities, and very little in others, depending on
the way funds are handled by the chiefs and local councils.49 In fact,
Scott et al50 have argued that none of the CDAs signed met the
requirements of the Mining and Minerals Act of 2009. In view of this
challenge, the GoSL has recently formed a multi-stakeholder group led
by the National Minerals Agency to create an agreement template that
will serve as a model for mine/site negotiations and implementation.51
However, new challenges are already emerging with one paramount
chief balking at the increased transparency, while new concerns are
being raised over the ability of the civil society organizations to monitor
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compliance, as well as the criteria necessary to determine community
eligibility.52
In general, control of corruption remains a significant challenge. In
the past three years Sierra Leone’s Corruption Perception Index has
remained relatively steady (with a score of 31 in 2012 and 2014, and
30 in 2013) occupying spot 119 of 175.53 In the past, the fight against
abuse of public office has been hindered by a weak Anti-Corruption
Committee (ACC), given only investigative powers and not backed by
the judiciary or the attorney general. In 2008, a new Anti-Corruption
Act was passed, strengthening the ACC’s independence by granting it
prosecuting powers. It has since convicted over 60 people, including
high-level government officials. With corruption so prevalent, little of
the natural resource revenues and associated income taxes are actually
reaching the official state coffers.
In addition to addressing corruption, other encouraging changes
are taking place. In recent years, the government has taken several
steps to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Legislation relating to
FDI includes the Investment Code (2005), the Business Registration
Act (2007), the Investment Promotion Agency Act (2007), the
Companies Act (2009) and the Bankruptcy Act (2009). Furthermore,
a national Private Sector Development Plan came into effect in 2009.54
These reforms are meant to provide greater protection for companies
investing in Sierra Leone, streamline the process of business
engagement, as well as open up more opportunities for ownership
and control. After a decade-long decline during the civil conflict, FDI
grew from 2004 on, peaking at US$950 million in 2011.55 It has since
declined again with the most recent data showing US$579 million in
2013, still well above the average of US$7 million during the decade
of conflict from 1990 to 2000).56
The government is also making progress in removing administrative
obstacles in an attempt to attract foreign investment. While ease of
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doing business has improved since 2006 when Sierra Leone was marked
168th (out of 175 countries), the 2016 position of 147th on the Doing
Business index (out of the 189 countries), is slightly down from 2014
when it was140th.57 In addition, the GoSL has created a multi-
stakeholder group, which includes members from the government,
private sector, and civil society, which will assess and review the largely
outdatedcore mineral policy currently in place using the AMV as a
template.58 Plans to review the MMA are also underway.
The diaspora has also supported the economy while abroad through
remittances of around US$450 million per annum over the period from
2009 to 2012. Observably, Sierra Leone’s post-conflict environment
continues to seriously hamper the level of investment and economic
diversification needed for long-term stability of the country and the
consolidation of democracy. Despite the aforementioned improvements,
severe shortage of skilled workers and managers, rampant corruption,
lack of infrastructure (roads and technology), cumbersome customs
procedures, weak judiciary, lack of an effective land titling system, and
an underdeveloped banking system continue to deter investors.
Thesefactors are exacerbated by the countrywide lack of electricity,
telecommunications, and poor water supply.
The peace is fragile and identifying and promoting the policies which
have been successfully implemented is key in continuing to advance
the state’s reconstruction. To continue to achieve economic growth
and reap the benefits of the wealth of natural resources in the country,
checks and balances on government actions are necessary.59 This
includes reaffirming freedom of the press,60 improving taxation and
investment, and controlling corruptionamong other things. Each citizen
and stakeholder has an important role in the political and economic
reconstruction of Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, many of the positive
322 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
gains made in the last few years have been set back by the Ebola crisis
and the diminishing prices of commodities such as iron ore.
4.2 Community Level
In a number of resource-rich countries in Africa, including Sierra Leone,
the relationship between resource extraction and marginalization of
youth has been critical in fermenting conflict, highlighting corruption,
and affecting the governable space61 particularly at the level of the
chieftaincy and community. The economic marginalization of youth
has been ongoing and was one of the causes of the civil war. As artisanal
and small-scale mining is decreasing, so is employment for the unskilled.
Large commercial mining companies require skilled workers, and while
the chiefs and community leaders continue to receive rents from large-
scale mining operations, the unskilled youth will be faced with even
less opportunities.62 In a state in which one third of the population is
aged between 15 and 35, and 70 per cent of youth are unemployed(or
underemployed),63 addressing the causes of such marginalization is
paramount, both to maintain peace as well as alleviate poverty.
Sierra Leone has much to gain from continuing to work toward a
stable and accountable government, an educated and employable youth
population, and well organized community governance structures.
Institutional and government oversight is still weak, tensions between
the central government and local chiefs common.64 While many policies
needed are already in place or on the horizon, it is the culture of
corruption that will be the hardest to weed out. This is where the
international community and TNCs, or the capital, can make a difference.
While the relationship between chiefs and mining companies seems
cordial on both sides, the community is less positive. Many women
and youth groups are clearly not satisfied with the current situation.65
Those groups that complain of a poor relationship with the chiefs
61 Watts.
62 Roy Maconachie, “Mining for Change? Youth Livelihoods and Extractive Industry
Investment in Sierra Leone” (2014) 54 Applied Geography 275 <http://
journals2.scholarsportal.info.libproxy.wlu.ca/pdf/01436228/v54icomplete/
275_mfcylaeiiisl.xml> accessed 3 July 2015.
63 UNDP, “UNDP in Sierra Leone” (2015) <http://www.sl.undp.org/content/
sierraleone/en/home/countryinfo/> accessed 10 April 2015.
64 “Interviews”.
65 ibid.
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emphasize a lack of communication andthe absence of forums for
community debates on topics related to conflict or other disagreements.
They further contend that the chiefs often side with the mining
companies in disputes, and their decisions are final.66 The youths
complain that firings by the companies are common and without cause,
allowing employees to rely on an income to support their extended
family, and then firing them suddenly,thus increasing the likelihood of
strikes and violence. Furthermore, the mining companies make other
forms of employment and money making challenging by blocking
roads.67 They also give ahighly unequal and generally lowremuneration
to their workers.68 Clearly the influence of the corporations on
community life is enormous, exerting on financial insecurity and
infrastructure gaps.
4.3 The Capital
While the TNCs might be expected to respect human rights and enter
countries in good faith, over the years the public has become aware of
the scandalous conditions under which many factories or mines operate.
These range from extremely low pay and employing young children, to
conditions that do not ensure employee safety. As public outcry
increased over the negligence of the TNCs, many of the big and powerful
corporations acted to safeguard their reputations. In response, various
frameworks and codes of conductsuch as the United Nations Global
Compact or, more recently, the United Nations Framework for Business
and Human Rights, have been enacted.69 These oblige businesses to
adhere to and protect human rights standards in the name of corporate
social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, many corporations are keenly




69 The United Nations Global Compact is a voluntary initiative based on
commitments by CEOs to support global sustainability principles. For more
information please see <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/> The new United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were established in
2011 in an effort to acknowledge the role of the private sector in the maintenance
of human rights. For more information please see <http://business-
humanrights.org>
70 ibid.
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Building trust and dealing with community grievances through good
communication and engagement are key to gaining the social approval
for operation. Ideally, this is where the Community Development
Agreements would fit in; unfortunately the financial commitment to
the CDAs continues to be debated even by the Ministry of Mines and
Minerals according to interviews done in Sierra Leone in 2014.71
Furthermore reports from the civil societyunderscore that many
corporations still do not engage the civil society in their operations
nor do they have a conflict resolution strategy that would help develop
and foster mutual trust and social capital among workers within the
communities in which they operate.72
In addition, all these guidelines and principles are voluntary, with
the very definition of CSR being that its activities should surpass legal
obligations of the business.73 Thus they are rarely systematically
implemented nor strictly overseen. In countries where CSR is
particularly needed, government oversight is often weak or absent,
thus lowering the incentive for TNCs even further. In fact, research has
shown that TNCs regularly report higher returns from states in which
governance is weak,74 and corporations have taken advantage of lax
regulations by negotiating deals which allow them to evade tax
collection.Yet, in a sense, CSR has become an obligation to the larger,
more politically powerful TNCs. The sway over political agendas so
sought after by the corporations comes at the cost of maintaining a
respectable reputation, which in turn creates vulnerability.75 As TNCs
seek to wield the power they have accumulated through lobbies and
other forums such as Davos, they are also being held to higher standards
and closely observed by the public. Mistakes are critically and loudly
proclaimed in media outlets, lessening the political sway of the
corporation when it is out of favour. CSR is a means to build that
reputation and social licence, and TNCs are expected to increasingly
71 “Interviews”.
72 CIVICUS, “Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone” (2006)
<http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_SierraLeone_Country_ Report.
pdf>.
73 Sarah Reiper, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Zones of Conflict” (2013).
74 Collier.
75 D Fuchs, “Commanding Heights? The Strength and Fragility of Business Power
in Global Politics” (2005) 33 Millennium –  Journal of International Studies, 771
<http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/03058298050330030501>
accessed 8 December 2014.
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fill roles that are traditionally reserved for governments, from providing
health care to its workers and the communities in which they are located,
to building roads and other infrastructure such as schools.That being
said, TNCs also benefit financially in the long term from maintaining
their reputation and social licence.
While corporations typically fulfil their global CSR responsibilities
in terms of environmental protection, for example, many fall short of
meeting the expectations for local goals (although there is little
consensus on what these entail exactly). With a lack of established
local forums for discussion and clear legislation around CDAs and other
company obligations, results are highly variable. Yet, to develop
sustainable community programmes and establish social licence, TNCs
have to improve their understanding of local conditions. This is
particularly important when workingin fragile, post-conflict
communities and states such as Sierra Leone.Increasingly, regional and
international legislation such as the Africa Mining Vision is created to
legally require TNCs to establish CSR programmes. Furthermore new
procedures, such as Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, which encourage
local partnerships and move beyond CSR, are gaining traction.
Post-conflict states like Sierra Leone offer unique challenges to TNCs
beyond the anticipated security risks. Investment in these states requires
corporations to assess conflict risks, along with human and
environmental ones. CSR programmes need to be both conflict sensitive,
in that they minimize the potential of the project to provoke or intensify
conflict, and conflict relevant, by contributing directly to peace building
and to the prevention of new conflict.76 Sensitivity to the local context
and history is even more important, as post-conflict communities often
remain vulnerable, suspicious, and distrustful. The residual effects of
trauma from past conflicts, particularly long lasting civil wars such as
the one in Sierra Leone, mean that small events can easily trigger
outbursts of violence and conflict.
Ideally, CSR can help stabilize the peace, foster good governance
and help strengthen institutions leading to security and better
productivity for businesses in the long term. At the same time, local
expectations are often extremely high, which makes it near impossible
to meet them. Such has been the experience of Sierra Leone and other
post-conflict states in which corporations make various promises only
76 Reiper.
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to renege on them later. Too often, corporations engage in community
initiatives only once conflict is already brewing or has erupted. For
example, in the Kono district, Milestone Trading only fulfilled its
promises of repairing the roads and building a school in the Sandor
Chiefdom in 2006 after the local employees and youths threatened to
disrupt mining activities.77
TNCs have participated positively in community settings by building
schools, training workers, and establishing relationships with
community leaders. Examples of such successful projects include a
vocational school in Lunsar, set up by London Mining and GIZ.78  While
attempts have been made by the various corporations in Sierra Leone
to contribute to the community in sustainable and important ways,
there have also been many instances of displacement, corruption, lack
of communication and destruction of livelihoods by establishing mining
operations on previously held agricultural lands.79 Many of these were
preventable.
5.  DISCUSSION
By the time the civil war ended in 2002, Sierra Leone’s physical and
bureaucratic infrastructure had been decimated and its most highly
skilled citizens had fled the country. The two most urgent requirements
for rebuilding the shattered economy were to revive key government
institutions such as the central bank and to establish a financial
regulatory framework for the private sector to start functioning again.
In the years preceding the civil war, certain ill-fated policy responses to
external factors along with mismanagement of the economy by various
administrations had resulted in a general decline in economic activity
and a serious deterioration of economic infrastructure.
Today, Sierra Leone faces another trial as the economy suffers from
the consequences of the Ebola crisis and general decline of prices for
77 Sigismond A. Wilson, “Company-Community Conflicts over Diamond Resources
in Kono District, Sierra Leone” (2013), 26 Society and Natural Resources 254.
<http://journals1.scholarsportal.info.libproxy.wlu.ca/pdf/08941920/
v26i0003/254_ccodrikdsl.xml> accessed 6 April 2015.
78 GIZ, “Technical Vocational Education and Training in Sierra Leone” (2013)
<http://www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/giz2013-en-psp-sierra-leone-
london-mining.pdf> accessed 11 April 2015.
79 “Interviews”.
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iron ore, down by 40 per cent in particular. The return of an efficient
and reliable financial regime is of paramount importance as it allows
foreign investment and development aid to channel funds into projects
that help the government and the society to rebuild. It makes it easier
for the private sector to fund commercial ventures, makes credit easier
to arrange, and revives general confidence in Sierra Leone’s economy.
In particular, stable macroeconomic and fiscal policies would go far to
attract foreign investment and development aid.
Notably, for government to make substantial progress in attracting
foreign investment, it needs to reduce business constraints and
bottlenecks. Corruption continues to impede provision of services;
widespread poverty and its associated consequences remain largely
unaddressed; and external peace building and investment efforts have
not lived up to their potential. While the country’s GDP has been
increasing until recently and the government is making progress in
removing administrative obstacles in an attempt to attract foreign
investment, daunting challenges still threaten the fragile peace. In the
medium tolong term, it should focus on strengthening the rule of law
and horizontal accountability, continue with the implementation of a
revenue tax for TNCs, and foster an efficient financial regime, all of
which will contribute to effective and sustainable economic and social
development. As Collier and Hoeffler suggest, the government, as well
as the international community, should also examine the effectiveness
of the methods in which revenues are spent in ways similar to the
analysis of aid effectiveness, creating best practices.
As for the TNCs, it has not been enoughto just establish strict
guidelines that companies voluntarily submit to in the majority of cases.
The country lack methods of oversight once the national governments
are weak. As such, it may be necessary to have a framework that would
include the countries importing natural resources and the home
countries of the TNCsgiving an additional level of oversight. One such
framework has been proposed by Wenar.80 He compares the involvement
and capital injection of resource importers in the resource-rich countries
to “plugging in a high-voltage line” into the economy. If it is “well
wired politically and economically” it will glow brightly, if it is not, the
results are short circuits, explosions, and fires.81 While the allegory is
80 Leif Wenar, “Fighting the Resource Curse” (2013) 4 Global Policy, 298.
81 ibid 299.
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apt and the responsibilities of importing countries and foreign mining
companies crucial, the policy framework the author proposes in
response, is weak, and does not provide the resource-cursed country
with opportunities to develop in a manner that benefits its population.
According to Wenar, importing countries reinforce the resource curse
by supporting the coercive powers able to deliver the resources needed,
thereby creating a “might makes right” cycle which does not support
the creation of a responsible and accountable government, but
empowers authoritarian governments and warlords who use force and
coercion to take possession of the natural resources and sell them. His
suggested solution involves what he terms the “Clean Trade” policy
framework, which, in very simple terms, would oblige signatories to
discontinue resource imports from countries which do not qualify, based
on criteria which judge government accountability and citizen
ownership and control of natural resources. In order to avoid a circuitous
route of acquiring the banned resources through indirect import from
non-signatories of goods containing these resources, Wenar proposes
the establishment of Clean Trade trusts, into which the signatories
would pay when importing the resources indirectly, in the form of a
tax, and which would be held in trust for the citizens of the resource-
rich country. These funds would then be discharged once the government
of the country is deemed accountable and responsible.
The framework proposed clearly has many faults and it is a rather
simplistic summary of what would be an extremely complex
arrangement. Even without the obvious issue of how the sudden lack
of investment in the disqualified countries would negatively influence
the poorest of the population and stall the little development progress
that trade may be helping to make, there remain many other red flags
and complications. These include who and how the judgement of
suitability and qualification would be made once the trusts are to be
transferred (back) to the resource-rich countries.
Observably, Wenar does address a crucial point, which is the role
of the foreign states and companies investing in and exploiting resources
from countrieswhich are clearly struggling with the resource curse. As
things are, the consumers and governments of developed nations are
absolutely supporting a framework of might makes right, allowing
transnational corporations (TNCs) to negotiate with authoritarian
governments and elites, and engage in bribery, supporting the pervasive
corruption so common in resource-cursed states. While TNCs are
understandably profit-focused and thus not inherently interested in
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the betterment of the lives of the people in every country in which
they function, the foreign or developedcountries are already well on
their way to imposing increasingly sophisticatedinternational compacts
and agreements which call for CSR, transparency, and accountability.
It is not too soon to take the next step.
As TNCs engage more in public policy formation, and as consumers
become more aware of the way business is being done through media
and other sources, it may be prudent to include international regulations
on labelling goods containing resources obtained in ways which
improve the livelihoods of people living in the community rather than
fostering conflict. As in the campaign that profoundly changed the global
view of diamonds, marking some as blood diamonds, the foreign
countries may be able to lead consumers away from goods produced
with natural resources extracted by companies with bad human rights
records. If a label with a score or ranking on compliance with human
rights and CSR or FPIC standards were to be placed on certain goods
made with natural resources, consumers would be empowered to push
TNCs toward better practices by choosing the product with a higher
score.Naturally this framework too has multiple shortcomings, not the
least of which is deciding on how to score the companies and products
and how to label them. Its strength is that it empowers consumers
and works directly on the reputation and bottom line of the company.
6.  CONCLUSION
States feature governable spaces at various levels. Post-conflict states
with the resource curse are even more complex. Understanding the
levels of governance and goals of actors involved can contribute to
unravelling the curse. As governments of resource cursed countries
such as Sierra Leone struggle to restructure, attract investment, curb
corruption, and alleviate poverty, the international community and
particularly the TNCs also have a role to play. First and foremost, an
in-depth examination of best practices and lessons learned for natural
resource management in post-conflict states is key. Akin to the aid
effectiveness forums which have developed guidelines for both donors
and recipient countries, natural resource management should also
feature prominently on international agendas. Here there is also an
opportunity for successful resource-rich states to share their knowledge
as much as possible. Furthermore, a serious push toward accountability
and transparency in CSR, as well as firm commitment to the codes of
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conduct already in place are in the best interest of consumers, as well
as the importing and exporting states.
While Sierra Leonehas made obvious progress, there are some
crucial steps that still need to be taken towards the strengthening of
the rule of law and horizontal accountability to tackle the challenge of
economic recovery in a post-conflict environment.Both the management
of natural resources and youth unemployment in particular, are potential
triggers for renewed conflict. As the country attempts to survive the
Ebola outbreak, bankruptcy of some of its biggest mining companies,
and the low commodity prices, much will need to be done.
